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Summary 
This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and 
democracy. We establish a political economy model where the effect of democracy on 
corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection. Our 
empirical analysis with cross-national panel data provides evidence that is consistent with 
the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the effect of democratization on corruption depends 
on the protection of property rights and income equality which shows that corruption is a 
nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work better as 
a control of corruption if the property rights system works and there is a low level of income 
inequality. On the other hand if property rights are not secured and there is strong income 
inequality, democracy may even lead to an increase of corruption. In addition, property 
rights protection and the mitigation of income inequality contribute in a strong manner to 
the reduction of corruption. 
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This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and 
democracy.  We  establish  a  political  economy  model  where  the  effect  of  democracy  on 
corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection. Our empirical 
analysis  with  cross-national  panel  data  provides  evidence  that  is  consistent  with  the 
theoretical prediction. Moreover, the effect of democratization on corruption depends on the 
protection of property rights and income equality which shows that corruption is a nonlinear 
function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work better as a control 
of corruption if the property right system works and there is a low level of income inequality. 
On the other hand if property rights are not secured and there is strong income inequality, 
democracy may even lead to an increase of corruption. In addition, property rights protection 
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1.  Introduction 
Rose-Ackerman  (1999,  p.127)  stresses:  “Democracies  based  on  strong  legal  foundation 
provide a stable framework for economic activity. For this framework to operate efficiently, 
however, politicians must seek reelection and must feel insecure about their prospects, but 
not too insecure. This leads to a „paradox of stability‟. Too much security of tenure can 
further corrupt arrangements. Too much insecurity can have the same effect.” Interestingly, 
prior  literature  on  the  relationship  between  democracy  and  corruption  provides  mixed 
evidence. Ades and Di Tella (1999) find that fewer political rights are correlated to low 
corruption levels. Ades and Di Tella (1997) and Fisman and Gatti (2002), however, fail to 
find any substantial effects on corruption of political rights and civil liberties respectively. 
Triesman (2000) does not find a significant direct effect of democracy on corruption either, 
but he documents that the duration of democracy significantly reduces corruption. On the 
other hand, Goldsmith (1999) reports that political democratization is associated with a lower 
degree of political corruption. Chowdhury (2004) also finds that the presence of democracy 
can  reduce  the  level  of  corruption  significantly.  From  a  slightly  different  angle,  Bohara, 
Mitchell and Mittendorff (2004) highlight that citizens‟ participation in competitive elections 
increases  the  control  of  corruption.  Recently,  Goel  and  Nelson  (2005)  provide  empirical 
evidence  that  less  democratic  countries  always  have  a  higher  incidence  of  corruption. 
Emerson (2006) also shows that more political rights have a depressing effect on corruption. 
Billger and Goel (2009), however, document in their quantile regressions that democracy 
significantly reduces corruption only in the most corrupt countries.  
      Instead of exclusively testing the linear democracy-corruption association, Montinola and 
Jackman (2002) provide evidence that the effect of political competition on corruption is 
nonlinear. Corruption is lower in dictatorial countries than in ones partially democratized. It 
will, however, decline after the democratic level has reached a threshold. Sung (2003), on the 
other hand, reports that the cubic function best fits the cross-national data on the relationship 
between democracy and corruption.  
      Inconsistent empirical results suggest the demand for theoretical guidance. Unfortunately 
there is little theoretical evidence on the relationship except Mohatdi and Roe (2003).  They 
build a two-sector endogenous growth model where agents switch between rent seeking and 
production. Then a reversed-U effect of democratization on corruption is derived. Rents and 
hence levels of corruption increase in the young democracies but decrease in the mature 
democracies.  However,  it  is  a  question  of  whether  their  longitudinal  section  mechanism, 2 
 
though enlightening, is able to explain existing cross-section evidence of the nexus between 
democracy and corruption. 
      Currently, two empirical articles more related to our study have emerged. Rock (2007) 
utilizes  the  instrument  variable  approach  to  empirically  show  an  inverted  U  relationship 
between  democracy  and  corruption.  Saha  et  al.  (2009),  however,  perform  fixed-effect 
regressions  to  find  that  economic  freedom  always  reduces  corruption,  while  democracy 
increases corruption under weak economic freedom and decreases corruption under strong 
economic freedom. Both papers document the complexity of the nexus between democracy 
and corruption. However, the corruption indices both papers use are actually not suitable for 
panel analysis, which we will discuss later. And the economic freedom index in Saha et al. 
(2009) contains eight components ranging from micro business freedom to macro monetary 
freedom. This has the disadvantage that it is difficult to identify a clear mechanism for the 
interactions between democracy, economic freedom and corruption from their results. Indeed 
Goel and Nelson (2005) found that different components of economic freedom influence 
corruption in different ways. 
      This  paper  attempts  to  clarify  miscellaneousness  in  past  research  with  a  uniform 
framework, therefore, contributing to the literature on the linkage between democracy and 
corruption. We first develop a theoretical model that incorporates the effects of property 
rights  protection  and  income  distribution  into  the  relationship  between  democracy  and 
corruption.  The  final  effect  of  democracy  on  corruption  depends  on  the  combination  of 
property rights protection and income distribution in a country. For example, Uslaner (2008) 
stresses that the transition to democracy and a market economy in Eastern Europe brought 
great instability and rising levels of inequality. Then we utilize a large panel sample including 
about  108 countries  from  1995-2006 to  examine the  conclusion  of the theory. With two 
alternative measures of democracy, our empirical analysis adopts the fixed-effect approach, 
and then the instrumental variable approach, to validate important aspects of the theoretical 
model.  We  find  in  our  empirical  analysis  that  the  effect  of  democracy  on  corruption 
obviously  depends  on  the  level  of  property  rights  protection  and  income  equality.  The 
democracy‟s effect is different under different property rights protection and income equality 
conditions. The finding  is particularly robust for property rights protection. We therefore 
provide  an  insightful  mechanism  for  the  nexus  between  democracy  and  corruption,  both 
theoretically and empirically.   3 
 
      The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. 
Section  3  provides  the  corresponding  empirical  analysis.  Section  4  concludes  with  some 
comments. 
2.  Theory 
Current  conflicting  linear  and  nonlinear  evidence  of  the  linkage  between  democracy  and 
corruption may imply that further factors need to be taken into account in order to thoroughly 
understand the relationship. From our point of view, the impact of democracy on corruption 
is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection, which can be seen in the 
model that follows.  
      According to our knowledge, there are only two recent theoretical studies related to ours. 
As discussed above, Mohatdi and Roe (2003) model the association between democracy and 
corruption.  Alesina  and  Angeletos  (2005),  with  a  non-overlapping-generation  model, 
document the existence of multiple steady states in the levels of inequality, redistribution and 
corruption.  It  seems  that  no  work,  however,  has  explicitly  explored  the  nexus  between 
democracy, income distribution, property rights and corruption. We aim to fill this void. 
      Mohatdi and Roe (2003) assume that “democracy is about the flow of information and 
access to the government” (p. 450). We, however, follow Dahl (1974) who stress that from a 
constitutional perspective the essence of democracy is electoral participation and political 
competition. In line with Murphy et al. (1993) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005), we treat 
corruption as a rent-seeking activity. 
      The  political  economy  mechanism  provided  here  is  closely  related  to  Persson  and 
Tabellini (1994). The pivotal voter in a country determines the redistribution policy. The 
redistributive decision therefore hinges on the difference between the income of the pivotal 
voter and the average income in  the society.  Unequal  societies  where  the income of the 
pivotal voter is lower than the average income consequently have more redistribution from 
the rich to the poor than equal ones. Rent-seeking activities and hence corruption emerges in 
the allocation of the redistributive tax revenue. Furthermore, in the absence of property rights 
protection,  the  rich  are  likely  to  gain  more  from  appropriation  of  the  redistributive  tax 
revenue  than  the  poor  though  all  have  the  access  to  the  appropriation  (rent-seeking) 
technology  (Gradstein,  2007).  Redistribution  thus  cannot  mitigate  income  inequality  as 
expected.  As  a  result,  high  levels  of  corruption  and  income  inequality  might  be  self-
sustaining in democracies with unsecure property rights. Oligarchies, however, may avoid 
this situation because their “pivotal agents” are often richer than the average. The situation 4 
 
can  also  be  mitigated  or  even  eliminated  in  democracies  with  equal  income  distribution 
and/or secure property rights. In sum, it can be seen that democracy may breed corruption 
due  to  intensive  redistribution,  especially  in  countries  which  lack  income  equality  and 
property rights protection. Below we will discuss this in detail. It is worth noting that unlike 
some  prior  studies,  we  treat  democracy  as  an  exogenous  variable  in  order  to  focus  on 
studying the relationship between democracy and corruption. 
2.1.  The Model 
We  consider  a  non-overlapping-generations  model  where  altruistic  individuals  with 
monotonic preferences live only for one period. Each generation comprises a large number of 
individuals distributed uniformly over      . Similar to Gradstein (2007), each member   in 
generation   has the following utility: 
                                                                   (1) 
where     is his own consumption,       is the income in next period accrued to his child. The 
budget constraint is, 
                                                                             (2) 
where     is income of individual   from his parent,       is his productive capital and       is 
his unproductive capital in rent seeking. For convenience we further assume 
                                                                          (3) 
where    is the average income of generation  .               , and its distribution therefore 
indicates the degree of income inequality in the model economy. The production function 
without government is   
              
                                                       (4) 
which exhibits diminishing returns to scale. 
      Following Alesina and Angeletos (2005), we assume that the government levies a flat tax 
on individual capital to fund a lump-sum transfer across all individuals. The tax rate is   
which is decided by previous voting. Then the sum of the transfer is  ∫        
 
  . However, 
the distribution of the transfer among individuals is determined by rent seeking activities. 
Similar to Sonin (2003) and Gradstein (2007), we suppose that the share of the transfer which 
the individual   can grab is  
                                                           
                   
∫                       
 
 
                                                      
which implies that given the level of public property rights protection         ), the share of 
transfer an individual gains increases with his own input and decreases with the competing 5 
 
inputs  of  the  others.  According  to  Alesina  and  Angeletos  (2005),  the  corruption  level  is 
plausibly assumed to increases with the amount of transfer. 
      Then the net capital endowment of individual   after redistribution is given by productive 
and unproductive investments:  
                                 
   
                       
∫                       
 
 
∫        
 
 
                                         
And the output produced by individual   in period t+1 is  
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∫        
 
 
                             
So the utility of individual   can be expressed as following, 
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∫        
 
 
                                     
Similar to Sonin (2003) and Gradstein (2007), we assume that ∫        
 
   and ∫              
 
   
are exogenous to any individual since there are numerous individuals in each generation.  
2.2.  Economic Equilibrium 
Given the policy, each individual makes his optimal decision
1. 
   
               
    
                                     
In the economic equilibrium, individual   hence has 
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where we let 
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1 Following the spirit of Gradstein (2007),  we do not include taxation into the budget constraint because the 
government does not consume any in our simple model. And taxation here is a component of the technology (7) 
that agents employ. There are actually two stages in the technology. In the first stage agents obtain their net 
capital  endowment  by  paying  taxes  and  rent  seeking.  Agents  then  produce  output  with  their  net  capital 
endowment. 6 
 
 Here we can easily find that       and       decrease while       increases when      rises, which 
is consistent with prior findings. The optimal utility of individual   is  
                                         (            
 
 
          
    
)                                          
where   denotes the constant term, 
                                                   
2.3.  Political Equilibrium 
The optimal tax rate       to individual   must satisfies 
    
      
    
So      
   is solved as  
                                                           
   
     
  
 
                 
                                                         
 If  the  tax  rate  is  determined  by  a  majority  vote  in  the  society,  the  pivotal  voter   will 
eventually decide the tax rate. 
                                                        
   
     
  
 
                 
                                                           
Not losing generality, we suppose that               , where    is the average income of 
individuals in time   and     hence indicates income inequality in the economy. Then  
                                                        
   
     
  
 
                      
                                                  
As in Alesina and Angeletos (2005),  the tax rate   in our model indicates the corruption 
level because the increase in tax rate leads to the enhancement of rent-seeking for tax revenue 
and hence the rise of corruption levels, or vice versa. Therefore, we conclude from equation 
(15) that the effect of democracy on corruption depends on property rights protection, income 
inequality and economic development of a society. Under some circumstances democracy 
may even increase corruption. However, one should note that we use a simplistic notion of 
democratization where the process is mainly the delegation of power by a pivotal voter in the 
previous enfranchised group (the elite) to another citizen, who turns out to be the pivotal 
voter in the extended enfranchised group
2. The extended enfranchised group is therefore, as 
                                                 
2 For  example,  the  model  disregards  positive  externalities  derived  in  a  direct-democratic  environment  via 
referenda and initiative. Being able to renegotiate and shape the political environments can lead to an increase in 
civic virtues. The more citizens can participate in political decision making by popular rights, the more the 
“political contract” is based on trust between state/public officials and the citizens which may promote civic 7 
 
historical evidence suggests, often poorer than the previous enfranchised group, on average. 
The income level of the pivotal voter, namely the median voter, in the extended enfranchised 
group is lower than that of the previous pivotal voter. This means that democratization tends 
to make a poorer citizen the pivotal voter. According to (15), democratization may raise the 
tax rate due to increased demand for redistribution, which eventually results in corruption, 
other things  equal.  The effect  of democracy  will  be  obstructed  in  countries  with  income 
inequality and inefficient protection of property. This finding is similar in spirit to Cervellati 
et  al.  (2008)  who  contend  that  under  high  income  inequality,  democracy  causes  social 
conflict while oligarchy can avoid it.  
      The  second  conclusion  deduced  from  (15)  is  that  ceteris  paribus,  income  inequality 
causes corruption. When there is high income inequality in a country:          the pivotal 
voter‟s income is below the average hence they tend to choose a high tax rate for more 
redistribution, which in turn results in more corruption. When income distribution is more 
equal in a society:          the pivotal voter, with his income above average, will select a 
low tax rate due to his disinclination for redistribution, which therefore reduces corruption. In 
sum, income inequality is a fertile ground for corruption, especially in democracies. Actually 
Glaeser et al. (2003) and Sonin (2003) also claim that unequal income distribution is a hotbed 
for poor governance. 
      The conclusions above are in the spirit of “tyranny of the majority”, which Tocqueville 
(1835) warned may occur in democracies. Tyranny of the majority refers to the circumstance 
where the majority might use its strength in a democracy to place its interests above those of 
the  minority.  Specifically,  if  income  distribution  is  unequal  in  a  country,  the  democratic 
system providing more political equality might lead to excessive redistribution or even public 
expropriation, which can weaken property rights protection and cause corruption. This danger, 
however, will not appear in the ideal state with prefect equality and freedom as depicted by 
Tocqueville.  
      It is obviously that property rights protection is negatively correlated with corruption in 
our model. This is reasonable since secure property rights limit expropriation (Besley and 
Ghatak,  2009).  In  (15)       
  decreases  when      increases,  which  suggests  that  property 
rights protection depresses corruption. We can confirm this result from below 
                                                                                                                                                        
duty. Citizens are in this case treated as “citizens” with extensive rights and obligations (Frey, 2003). The voting 
procedure, especially public discussions prior to votes, creates a sense of civic duty, as citizens become aware of 
the importance of following the endogenously generated rules. The possibility to vote promotes social norms of 
compliance and therefore may reduce corruption.  8 
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∫        
 
 
∫              
 
 
)                                         
     As we know,        is negatively correlated with the level of property rights  protection 
since  rational  individuals  will  invest  more  on  expropriation  under  weaker  protection  of 
property rights, other things being equal.  Therefore     ⁄  reflects the security of property 
rights. Inequality (16) shows that secure property rights reduce or control corruption, which 
coincides with the above finding. We can further deduce from equation (15) that property 
rights protection may act as a multiplier of democracy and income inequality in terms of 
influence over corruption. In addition, democracy might influence property rights protection 
via the tax rate. However, the mechanism here is somewhat indirect: voting decides the tax 
rate      
   hence affects         and      , and through this channel it finally influences property 
rights protection       ⁄ . 
      It is worth noting that as Cervellati et al. (2008) argue, democracy is neither sufficient nor 
necessary  for  protection  of  property  rights,  although  it  has  often  been  found  to  promote 
property rights protection. Actually Glaeser et al. (2004) observed secure property rights in 
oligarchies. 
      Last but not least, based on the inequality derived from (15):       
      ⁄      we can 
demonstrate the basic fact that the average income level, namely economic development, 
controls corruption, which has been verified by most empirical studies (Treisman, 2007).  
  To summarize, our theoretical finding is that corruption level is jointly determined by 
democracy, property rights protection, income and income inequality. Specifically, the effect 
of  political  democracy  on  corruption  depends  on  other  social  and  economic  conditions: 
property rights protection, income and income inequality. 
3.  Evidence 
Our empirical analysis employs data from a large sample of 108 countries during the period 
1995–2006. We first discuss the methodology and data used and report the results afterwards. 
3.1.  Methodology and Data 
Our  empirical  analysis  aims  to  shed  new  light  on  the  causal  effect  of  democracy  on 
corruption testing our theoretical predictions. We are aware of the potential bias in OLS 
identification due to the endogeneity problem that omitted historical factors might influence 
both  corruption  and  democracy.  We  therefore  employ  two  strategies  to  address  the 
endogeneity  problem.  Our  first  strategy  is  to  use  fixed  effects  regressions  to  deal  with 9 
 
potential biases, since the omitted variables here affecting both corruption and democracy are 
generally institutional or country-specific, which are approximately time-invariant. However, 
the conventional fixed effects approach is not applicable in the current situation. As seen 
below, key explanatory variables such as democracy and property rights protection in our 
regressions  rarely  changes  and  hence  are  nearly  time-invariant.  Standard  fixed  effects 
regression is inefficient in estimating the effect of minutely varying variables. According to 
Plumper  and  Troeger  (2007,  p.125),  “An  inefficient  estimation  is  not  merely  a  nuisance 
leading to somewhat higher SEs. Inefficiency leads to highly unreliable point estimates and 
may thus cause wrong inferences in the same way a biased estimator could.” We therefore 
adopt a common strategy utilized by economists and political scientists in their empirical 
analyses concerning institutions. Specifically, we group countries and areas in our study by 
the UN standard country and area codes classifications to generate regional dummies
3. Then 
we  use OLS  estimation including reg ional fixed effect dummies and time fixed effect 
dummies to identify the impact of democracy on corruption. With this approach we can raise 
the efficiency of our estimation by increasing the “within variance” while still controlling for 
most of omitted country-specific factors which may affect both corruption and democracy, 
since countries in the same category are to a large extent homogenous. For convenience, the 
approach  is  still  called  as  a  fixed-effects  approach  in  this  paper,  even  though  it  not  the 
conventional one. 
      The fixed effects approach, however, is not a substitute for the instrumental variables 
approach. For this reason our second strategy is to use the instrumental variables approach to 
identify the causal effect of democracy on corruption as there may be some time-variant 
omitted country  characteristics influencing both democracy and income, which cannot be 
controlled for by the fixed effects. Previous studies have made great efforts to address the 
endogeneity  problem  with  instruments.  Hall  and  Jones  (1999)  use  the  distance  from  the 
equator and the proportion of the population speaking a major European language as the 
instruments  for  institutional  quality.  Acemoglou  et  al.  (2001),  however,  suggest  that 
European settler mortality and aboriginal population density in 1500 can be employed as 
                                                 
3 There are originally 22 categories in the UN standard country and area codes classifications: Eastern Africa, 
Middle Africa, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Western Africa, Caribbean, Central America, South America, 
Northern  America,  Central  Asia,  Eastern  Asia,  Southern  Asia,  South-Eastern  Asia,  Western  Asia,  Eastern 
Europe,  Northern  Europe,  Southern  Europe,  Western  Europe,  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  Melanesia, 
Micronesia, Polynesia. However, we  treat Israel, the only Jewish state in the world, as an independent category 
since it is obviously different from neighbouring Arabic countries (see, Anderson, Seibert, and Wagner, 2006). 
Therefore, we actually categorize countries into 23 groups.  10 
 
instruments for current institutions in ex-colonies. When studying the effect of democracy on 
corruption,  Rock  (2007)  uses  the  population  fraction  of  protestant  and  the  latitude  of  a 
country‟s capital as instruments for democracy. All these instruments are intended to capture 
the western influence on current institutional quality. However, because the western influence 
is manifold and correlated with many aspects of institution, it is difficult to declare what 
specifically  these  variables  are  instruments  for.  As  we  know,  corruption  level  reflects 
institution quality. If we use these instruments for democracy in our case, they may influence 
corruption  through  not  only  the  channel  of  democracy  but  also  through  many  other 
institutional channels. It therefore violates the exclusion restriction. We hence need to choose 
a  more  specific  instrument  for  democracy  to  guarantee  the  validity  of  our  IV  approach. 
Following Mobarak (2005), we construct a dummy indicating any country with the largest 
proportion of population practicing Islam (CIA, the World Factbook 2000
4) as an instrument 
for democracy. The distribution of Muslims is of  course exogenous, especially in our time 
horizon. Huntington (1991, p. 307) argued: “To the extent that government legitimacy and 
policy flow from religious doctrine and religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ 
from  and  contradict  the  premises  of  democratic  politics.”  Treisman  (2000)  and  Paldam 
(2001),  on  the  other  hand,  have  found  that  the  direct  effect  of  Islam  on  corruption  is 
insignificant.  We therefore can plausibly suppose that the  Islamic  religion  influences  the 
corruption  level  only  through  the  channel  of  democracy.  This  validates  our  instrumental 
variable.  
      We now describe the data we use in our empirical analysis. To secure robustness, we 
attempt to employ alternative measures of key variables in our regressions. However, we 
cannot find more than one corruption measures suitable for panel analysis. Many researchers 
such as Treisman (2007) have pointed out that two corruption indices often used in research: 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International (TI) and Control 
of Corruption Indicator (CC) constructed by the World Bank
5, are actually inappropriate for 
panel analysis. Both indices have altered their constructing methodologies and data sources 
over the years. Annual variations of both indices may reflect changes in the methodologies 
and  data  sources rather than  actual  corruption perceptions.  Kaufmann and  Kraay (2002) 
acknowledge  that about  50% of  the  across-time  variance  of  the  CC  index  originates  in 
changes in data sources and weights assigned to each data source. We hence need to choose 
                                                 
4 http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2000/index.html 
5 Saha et al. (2009) and Rock (2007) use the two indices respectively. 11 
 
another common corruption measure: the rating of corruption in the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), to perform our panel regressions. The ICRG corruption index, ranging 
from  0  (most  corrupt) to 6  (least  corrupt), measures  the degree of  corruption within the 
political system (e.g., demand of special payments, bribes connected with import and export 
licenses,  exchange  controls,  tax  assessment,  police  protection,  or  loans)  prevailing  in 
countries  on  the  basis  of  the  experts‟  assessment.  The  ICRG  index  provides  comparable 
corruption data over time and across countries, and hence is the only corruption data set 
available for the panel analysis. To obtain a proxy for corruption rather than the lack of 
corruption we use negative values of the ICRG index in our estimations (-ICRG).  
   The first measure of democracy used to test our theoretical model is the Polity Regime 
Index:  Polity  2,  the  difference  between  the  Polity  Democracy  Indicator  and  the  Polity 
Autocracy Indicator in Polity IV database. It is coded on evaluation of the competitiveness of 
political  participation,  the  competitiveness  and  openness  of  executive  recruitment  and 
constraints on the chief executive. It ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). 
The second measure of democracy we use is the Political Rights Index from Freedom House. 
This index measures the degree to which citizens in a country have control over governors 
using  a  checklist  of  10  questions  about  the  electoral  process,  political  pluralism  and 
participation, and functioning of government. It ranges from 1 (highest political rights) to 7 
(lowest political rights). We use this index mainly as a robustness check, since one of its ten 
checklist questions assesses national corruption levels, which, as Rock (2007) points out, 
might lead to the problem regressing corruption on itself. To keep the consistency with the 
Polity2, we use negative values of the Political Rights Index in our regressions. 
  We use the property rights rating in the Index of Economic Freedom produced by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, commonly utilized in previous research, to 
measure  the  security  of  property  rights  in  our  analysis.  This  index,  ranging  from  0  (no 
protection of property rights) to 100 (full protection of property rights), mainly assesses the 
degree to which the laws of a country protect private property rights and the degree to which 
its government enforces those laws. According to our knowledge, no more data source of 
property rights  protection can cover our investigating period. The  Index of Protection of 
Property Rights compiled by the Fraser Institute, used in some priori studies, only covers 
2000-2006 hence cannot be employed in our analysis. 
  We do not construct the actual Gini coefficient series to measure income inequality over 
time and across countries since there is not a complete time series in many countries in the 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID). More importantly Gini coefficients available in 12 
 
WIID often seem incomparable across countries and/or over time due to their differences in 
survey  base  (income/expenditure),    concept,  population/area  coverage  and  several  other 
aspects.  As  income  equality  in  most  countries  does  not  change  dramatically  in  the  time 
perspective  of  a  decade,  we  instead  construct  a  dummy  to  indicate  income  equality  in 
countries  by  reviewing  all  available  WIID  data  in  our  investigating  period.  The  dummy 
equals to 0 if a country passes the international warning line for the Gini coefficient0.40, and 
1 otherwise. In this simple way, we reduce the measurement error of income equality data 
and make them more comparable. It is worth noting that we only consider income-based Gini 
coefficients in the dummy construction. Following Deininger and Squire's (1996), we add 6.6 
to the expenditure-based Gini coefficients if there are no income-based ones available in a 
country. 
  We also include other determinants of corruption identified by previous research in our 
regressions. GDP per capita, population, openness proxied by import volume in percent of 
GDP  and  natural  resource  abundance  proxied  by  fuel  exports  in  percent  of  merchandise 
exports  are  all  from  the  World  Development  Indicators.  Adult  literacy  rates,  reflecting 
education attainments of countries, are gathered from the UN Human Development Reports 
(1998-2009).  Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  data  come  from  Alesina  et  al.  (2003).  The 
detailed description of our data is provided in Table 1.  
 
  Table 1   Descriptive Statistics 
          Variable  Observations            Mean   Standard Deviation 
Corruption (ICRG)  1299  3.05  1.25 
Democracy (Polity IV)  1510  4.51  5.96 
Democracy (Freedom House)  1560  3.21  2.03 
Property Rights (Index)  1476  52.40  22.89 
Income Equality (Dummy)  1560  0.45  0.50 
GDP per capita  1541  6.38  9.90 
Literacy Rate  1534  82.06  27.16 
Resource abundance (Fuel export / Commodity export)  1289  12.16  21.74 
Openness (Import / GDP)  1513  44.76  25.83 
Ethnic fractionalization  1560  0.42  0.25 
Population  1548  0.45  1.45 
 
3.2.  Results 
To obtain intuitions directing econometric analysis, we first plot the relationship between 
democracy  and  corruption  in  Figure  1.  It  seems  that  both  the  linear  negative  effect  and 
quadratic  effect  of democracy  on  corruption  documented in  the literature are  reasonable. 
Such a descriptive analysis however, only gives us information about the raw effects, and not 13 
 
the  partial  effects.  We  then  test  the  relationship  between  democracy  and  corruption  in  a 
multivariate analysis. 
 
                          
                           Figure 1   Relationship between democracy and corruption 
 
       We  first  briefly  examine  previous  findings  with  (regional)  fixed-effects  panel 
regressions. Column (1) and (2) in Table 2 successfully replicate previous results supporting 
the findings that democracy reduces corruption (see Goldsmith 1999 and Rock 2009). When 
we  take  into  account  effects  of  property  rights  protection  and  income  inequality  on 
corruption,  the  linear  effect  of  democracy  in  column  (3)  loses  its  significance,  which 
correlates with Ades and Di Tella (1997), and Fisman and Gatti (2002). The quadratic effect 
of  democracy  in  column  (4),  however,  remains  statistically  significant.  It  seems  that  the 
nonlinear effect of democracy is robust, as Rock (2009) argues. However, in column (5) the 
quadratic term of democracy loses its significance when the interactions between property 
rights protection, income distribution and democracy is taken into consideration. The results 
actually indicate that the effect of democracy on corruption is modified by property rights 
protection and income distribution as can be seen looking at the interaction terms. The overall 
effect of democracy on corruption, therefore, depends on the combination of income equality 
and  security  of  property  rights  in  a  country,  as  predicted  by  our  theoretical  model.  The 
positive coefficient of democracy can be interpreted as the effect of democracy on corruption 
when property rights and income equality are 0. Thus, in countries with no property rights 
and a very high income inequality democracy induces corruption. The results of the two 
interaction  terms  also  indicate  that  a  high  level  of  property  rights  and  income  equality 
promote the controlling effect of democracy on corruption. 14 
 
         Table 2   Effect of democracy on corruption: review and implication (fixed effects results) 
  Corruption level (-ICRG) 
  Fixed effects  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5) 
Democracy  -0.020***  -0.0071  -0.0077  0.0017  0.047*** 
  (0.0060)  (0.0068)  (0.0067)  (0.0073)  (0.016) 
Democracy
2    -0.0049***    -0.0038***  -0.0018 
    (0.0013)    (0.0014)  (0.0015) 
GDP per capita  -0.062***  -0.058***  -0.044***  -0.042***  -0.039*** 
  (0.0052)  (0.0055)  (0.0059)  (0.0060)  (0.0062) 
Literacy rate  -0.0024***  -0.0022***  -0.0026***  -0.0025***  -0.0024** 
  (0.00076)  (0.00080)  (0.00089)  (0.00092)  (0.00010) 
Resource abundance  0.0055***  0.0048***  0.0031***  0.0027**  0.0030*** 
  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0011) 
Openness  -0.0054***  -0.0060***  -0.0035**  -0.0041***  -0.0045*** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0015)  (0.0016) 
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.15  -0.21  -0.16  -0.20  -0.26* 
  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Population  0.015  0.027  0.0023  0.012  0.018 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
Property rights      -0.013***  -0.012***  -0.0076*** 
      (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0028) 
Income equality      -0.28***  -0.26***  -0.18*** 
      (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.064) 
Democracy* Property rights          -0.00086*** 
          (0.00033) 
Democracy* Income equality          -0.037*** 
          (0.013) 
Constant  -2.90***  -2.66***  -2.13***  -1.99***  -2.21*** 
  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.21) 
R-squared  0.65  0.65  0.66  0.66  0.66 
Observations  1107  1107  1089  1089  1089 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.   
Regional and time fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. 
 
        It  makes  sense  to  provide  more  evidence  to  consolidate  our  new  finding.  Table  3 
supplies fixed-effect results as expected. Preliminary results are in column (1) and (2) with 
pooled-OLS regressions. Then we use regressions including regional and time fixed effects to 
obtain further results in column (3) and (4). Protection of property rights substantially reduces 
corruption as expected, while income inequality is an important source of corruption, which 
also coincides with our prediction. The coefficients are statistically significant in all four 
estimations.  More  importantly,  the  effect  of  democracy  on  corruption  is  observed  to  be 
significantly modified by property rights protection and income distribution. Both interaction 
terms are statistically significant with a negative sign. As to other controls, income level and 
education attainment are observed to significantly reduce corruption, which is in line with 15 
 
prior studies. And also consistent with literature, openness is found to decrease corruption, 
while resource abundance is observed to increase corruption.  
 
                  Table 3   Effect of democracy on corruption: fixed effect results 
  Corruption level (-ICRG) 
  Pooled OLS    Fixed Effects 
     (1)     (2)       (3)     (4) 
Democracy  0.034***  0.031**    0.038***  0.050*** 
  (0.013)  (0.015)    (0.014)  (0.015) 
Property rights  -0.023***  -0.020***    -0.017***  -0.0072*** 
  (0.0021)  (0.0025)    (0.0023)  (0.0027) 
Income equality  -0.23***  -0.17**    -0.23***  -0.18*** 
  (0.065)  (0.070)    (0.062)  (0.063) 
Democracy* Property rights  -0.00095***  -0.00062**    -0.00065**  -0.0010*** 
  (0.00024)  (0.00028)    (0.00028)  (0.00030) 
Democracy* Income equality  -0.034***  -0.032***    -0.046***  -0.040*** 
  (0.0092)  (0.010)    (0.012)  (0.013) 
GDP per capita    -0.023***      -0.040*** 
    (0.0053)      (0.0061) 
Literacy rate    -0.0038***      -0.0024** 
    (0.0012)      (0.00099) 
Resource abundance    0.0012      0.0032*** 
    (0.0013)      (0.0011) 
Openness    0.0019      -0.0043*** 
    (0.0013)      (0.0016) 
Ethnic fractionalization    -0.062      -0.26* 
    (0.12)      (0.15) 
Population    0.069***      0.014 
    (0.015)      (0.018) 
Constant  -1.39***  -1.34***    -2.41***  -2.29*** 
  (0.10)  (0.19)    (0.15)  (0.20) 
R-squared  0.50  0.54    0.63  0.66 
Observations  1232  1089    1232  1089 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively.   
 
      As  a  further  robustness  test,  we  rerun  the  regressions  in  Table  4  with  an  alternative 
measure  of  democracy,  namely  the  Political  Rights  Index.  Results  in  Table  4  generally 
support those in Table 3. The interaction term between democracy and income equality in 
Table 4 is the only exception. It shows the expected sign but loses statistical significance in 






                     Table 4   Effect of democracy on corruption: alternative measure of democracy  
  Corruption level (-ICRG) 
  Pooled OLS    Fixed Effects 
    (1)    (2)      (3)    (4) 
Democracy  0.11***  0.10**    0.055  0.14*** 
  (0.038)  (0.048)    (0.041)  (0.051) 
Property rights  -0.038***  -0.030***    -0.027***  -0.024*** 
  (0.0024)  (0.0033)    (0.0030)  (0.0032) 
Income equality  -0.50***  -0.44***    -0.28  -0.38** 
  (0.11)  (0.12)    (0.17)  (0.18) 
Democracy* Property rights  -0.0036***  -0.0028***    -0.0021***  -0.0039*** 
  (0.00070)  (0.00088)    (0.00081)  (0.00092) 
Democracy* Income equality  -0.064**  -0.058*    -0.018  -0.046 
  (0.028)  (0.031)    (0.037)  (0.040) 
GDP per capita    -0.022***      -0.037*** 
    (0.0044)      (0.0051) 
Literacy rate    -0.0034***      -0.0024*** 
    (0.0012)      (0.00093) 
Resource abundance    0.0011      0.0031*** 
    (0.0013)      (0.0011) 
Openness    0.0012      -0.0046*** 
    (0.0011)      (0.0012) 
Ethnic fractionalization    -0.083      -0.26* 
    (0.11)      (0.14) 
Population    0.059***      0.016 
    (0.015)      (0.017) 
Constant  -0.95***  -0.91***    -2.17***  -1.68*** 
  (0.15)  (0.23)    (0.22)  (0.26) 
R-squared  0.52  0.55    0.63  0.67 
Observations  1269  1119    1269  1119 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively.   
 
The previous regressions do not necessarily identify the causal effect of democracy on 
corruption, since both democracy and corruption might be influenced by an omitted time-
varying  factor.  We  therefore  introduce  IV  regressions  to  deal  with  potential  endogeneity 
problems. As discussed before, we utilize the Muslim dummy to instrument democracy in our 
2SLS regressions. Table 5 results generally support our earlier results. The interaction term 
between democracy and property rights protection remains statistically significant reporting 
the same sign. However, the product of democracy and income equality loses its statistical 
significance while remaining its expected sign. This result actually reflects the fact that the 
interaction between democracy and income equality is a bit weaker than the one between 





             Table 5   Effect of democracy on corruption: IV results 
  Corruption level (-ICRG) 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Democracy  0.13***  0.090**     
(Polity IV)  (0.040)  (0.044)     
Democracy          0.30***  0.19* 
(Political Rights Index)      (0.099)  (0.11) 
Property rights  -0.0031  -0.000097  -0.052***  -0.032*** 
  (0.0044)  (0.0048)  (0.0068)  (0.0075) 
Income equality  -0.20**  -0.19**  -0.039  -0.23 
  (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.26)  (0.22) 
Democracy* Property rights  -0.0036***  -0.0026***     
(Polity IV)  (0.00085)  (0.00092)     
Democracy* Income equality  -0.0089  -0.011     
(Polity IV)  (0.020)  (0.020)     
Democracy* Property rights      -0.0098***  -0.0063*** 
(Political Rights Index)      (0.0019)  (0.0021) 
Democracy* Income equality      0.029  -0.016 
(Political Rights Index)      (0.062)  (0.057) 
GDP per capita    -0.031***    -0.029*** 
    (0.0061)    (0.0051) 
Literacy rate    -0.0023*    -0.0025** 
    (0.0013)    (0.0010) 
Resource abundance    0.00073    0.00041 
    (0.0012)    (0.0013) 
Openness    -0.0045**    -0.0038** 
    (0.0020)    (0.0015) 
Ethnic fractionalization    -0.28**    -0.19** 
    (0.11)    (0.097) 
Population    0.057***    0.048*** 
    (0.017)    (0.016) 
Constant  -2.72***  -2.47***  -1.22***  -1.55*** 
  (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.41)  (0.48) 
First stage regressions 
F test of excluded IVs         
Democracy  102.77[0.00]  65.92[0.00]  142.89[0.00]  108.21[0.00] 
Democracy* Property rights  157.27[0.00]  80.25[0.00]  284.95[0.00]  165.40[0.00] 
Democracy* Income equality  183.99[0.00]  162.47[0.00]  324.67[0.00]  280.51[0.00] 
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic  97.62[0.00]  84.79[0.00]  116.78[0.00]  100.36[0.00] 
R-squared  0.52  0.60  0.56  0.63 
Observations  1232  1089  1269  1119 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-value in brackets, ***, ** and * denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively.   
     
       In general, the effect of democracy on corruption remains conditional on the protection 
level  of  property  rights  and  income  distribution  in  IV  regressions.  The  overall  effect  of 
democracy on corruption stays positive in countries with insecure property rights and unequal 
income distribution, while it turns negative in countries with secure property rights and equal 18 
 
income  distribution.  Control  variables  in  IV  regressions  also  have  similar  signs  and 
significances with those in the previous regressions. 
IV regressions can be justified only if the instrumental variable is valid. We hence need 
to check the validity of our instrument. On the bottom of Table 5 we can see that the Muslim 
dummy  satisfies  the  relevance  condition.  We  then  run  original  regressions  explicitly 
including the Muslim dummy. We find that the coefficient of Muslim dummy is small and 
statistically insignificant in Table A1 in the Appendix. It suggests that the Muslim dummy 
satisfies  the  exogeneity  condition:  it  influences  corruption  only  through  the  channel  of 
democracy. The validity of our instrumental variable is thus confirmed. 
       In  all  regressions  above,  economic  development  significantly  depresses  corruption, 
which is consistent with our theoretical prediction and previous empirical results. We here do 
not  care  much  about  the  potential  simultaneity  between  corruption  and  economic 
development because as Treisman (2000) and Gundlach and Paldam (2009) have documented 
with the IV approach, the causality in the cross-country analysis is generally from economic 
development to  corruption. As for  effects  of  other  controls  in  our regressions, education 
attainment and trade openness, significantly and robustly decrease corruption, as contended 
in  prior  literature.  Resource  abundance  and  country  size  (population)  appear  to  increase 
corruption, which is also in line with the earlier research. Ethnic diversity, however, counter- 
intuitively reduces corruption in our regressions. Treisman (2000) observed that the originally 
positive effect of ethnic diversity on corruption becomes negative and insignificant when 
controlling for economic development in cross-country regressions. His interpretation that 
ethnic diversity only indirectly influences corruption by reducing development, seems at odds 
with to our negative and significant results. Our theoretical model, however, provides us with 
a plausible explanation. There is always at least one ethnic group dominant in politics in an 
ethnically divided country. The pivotal voter in this kind of country therefore belongs to the 
dominant ethnic group(s). In practice, these ethnic groups are often richer than others due to 
the power in their hands. Ceteris paribus, the pivotal voter in an ethnically divided country, 
according to our model, will choose a relatively low tax rate since he is comparatively rich. 
This country then will have a low corruption level according to our mechanism. In other 
words  the  seemingly  counterfactual  effect  of  ethnic  division  in  our  regressions  actually 
provides a substantial support to our theoretical modeling.     
      To show the overall effect of democracy on corruption, we calculate the marginal effect 
of democracy on corruption. In our specification, the marginal effect of democracy can be 
expressed as 19 
 
                         
    
    
                             
       
                
       
                                     
where        
     
  and    
  are corruption, democracy, property rights protection and income 
distribution indicators of country   in period t respectively, while                         
   and 
            
   are the coefficients of democracy, the interaction term between democracy and 
property rights protection, and the interaction term between democracy and income equality. 
The  average  marginal  effects  of  democracy  computed  from  regressions  with  prior 
specification have been listed in Table 6. We find that the overall effect of democracy on 
corruption  is  significantly  negative.  This  supports  the  notion  that  democracy  reduces 
corruption. However, we also observe in Table 6 that both marginal effects of democracy in 
IV  regressions  are,  though  not  by  much,  obviously  smaller  than  those  in  fixed-effect 
regressions. The most plausible explanation for this is that there might be an unobserved 
time-variant variable causing:        
           (    is the error term in equation (16)). Fixed 
effects estimators hence are biased upwards. If this is the case, we can treat our fixed effects 
results as upper bounds of the causal effect of democracy on corruption as Acemoglu et al. 
(2008) suggest. 
 
                         Table 6   Marginal effect of democracy on corruption  
Democracy Measures    Polity IV Index    Political Rights Index 
    FE  IV    FE  IV 
Marginal Effects    -0.021
***  -0.053
***    -0.083
***  -0.15
*** 
    (0.0080)  (0.013)    (0.023)  (0.037) 
Observations    1089  1089    1119  1119 
 Standard errors in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively.   
 
      More importantly, with marginal effects in Table 6 we can reinterpret previous empirical 
research from a new angle. Most previous studies adopt the linear-additive model without 
interaction  terms,  to  study  the  relationship  between  democracy  and  corruption.  The 
coefficient on democracy in their linear-additive models actually represents the (weighted) 
average marginal effect of democracy in our interaction model (Brambor et al. 2006). The 
results obtained in Table 6 are consistent with most previous empirical papers, which support 
a negative linear effect of democracy on corruption. Our results also show that corruption is, 
in fact, a nonlinear function of several variables including democracy, property rights and 
income inequality. As in Sung (2004) and Rock (2009), higher degree terms of democracy 
such as the quadratic or cubic term in regression can partially reflect the actual nonlinear 20 
 
relationship  between  democracy  and  corruption,  and  might  be  significant  in  some  cases, 
though  this  kind  of  polynomial  approximation  is  not  very  appropriate.  In  sum,  without 
considering  the  interactions  between  democracy,  property  rights  protection  and  income 
distribution,  previous  studies  only  partially  capture  the  actual  effect  of  democracy  on 
corruption. 
4.  Conclusion 
Democracy  is  believed  to  have  many  beneficial  effects  on  countries.  However,  does  it 
prevent corruption? Rose-Ackerman (1999, p. 142) stresses: “Democratic elections are not 
invariably  a  cure  for  corruption.  Instead,  some  electoral  systems  are  more  vulnerable  to 
special influence than others. When narrow groups wield power, some use legal means, and 
others are corrupt”. Previous literature provides mixed evidence, which leaves the problem 
still open. In this study we find strong evidence that the effect of democracy on corruption 
depends upon other variables such as property rights or income inequality. In particular, we 
provide a theoretical and empirical investigation of the causal nexus between democracy and 
corruption. Our theoretical model offers a mechanism through which democracy influences 
corruption. It extends previous models by introducing property rights and income distribution 
into the theoretical framework. Our empirical results are consistent with the theoretical model. 
The effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and property 
rights  protection.  The  findings  indicate  that  democracy  will  work  better  as  a  control  of 
corruption if property right system works and there is a low level of income inequality. On 
the  other  hand  if  property  rights  are  not  secured  and  there  is  strong  income  inequality, 
democracy may even lead to an increase of corruption.  
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                     Table A1   Validity of instrument: Muslim  
  Corruption level (-ICRG) 
  (1)  (2) 
Democracy  0.030**   
(Polity IV)  (0.014)   
Democracy      0.11** 
(Political Rights Index)    (0.044) 
Property rights  -0.0098***  -0.025*** 
  (0.0025)  (0.0030) 
Income equality  -0.18***  -0.38*** 
  (0.063)  (0.10) 
Democracy* Property rights  -0.00084***   
(Polity IV)  (0.00027)   
Democracy* Income equality  -0.028***   
(Polity IV)  (0.0090)   
Democracy* Property rights    -0.0039*** 
(Political Rights Index)    (0.00082) 
Democracy* Income equality    -0.046* 
(Political Rights Index)    (0.027) 
GDP per capita  -0.037***  -0.032*** 
  (0.0052)  (0.0042) 
Literacy rate  -0.0027***  -0.0027*** 
  (0.0010)  (0.00095) 
Resource abundance  0.00043  0.00024 
  (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Openness  -0.0023*  -0.0025** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0011) 
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.16  -0.17* 
  (0.10)  (0.096) 
Population  0.062***  0.052*** 
  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Muslim dummy  0.094  0.041 
  (0.065)  (0.060) 
Constant  -2.23***  -1.80*** 
  (0.21)  (0.23) 
R-squared  0.62  0.63 
Observations  1089  1119 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively.   
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